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Programme
Seminars take place in LR8 in the Department of Engineering Science, Parks Road, Oxford (map), from 2pm to 4pm.
Trinity term seminars
28th April
Dov Gabbay
Non-Deductive Reasoning and Matrix Abduction
Abstract:We motivate and introduce a new method of abduction, Matrix Abduction, and apply it to modelling the use of non-deductive inferences in the Talmud such as Analogy and the rule of Argumentum A Fortiori. Given a matrix A with entries in {0, 1}, we allow for one or more blank squares in the matrix, say ai,j =?. The method allows us to decide whether to declare ai,j = 0 or ai,j = 1 or ai,j =? undecided. This algorithmic method is then applied to modelling several legal and practical reasoning situations including the Talmudic rule of Kal-Vachomer. We add an Appendix showing that this new rule of Matrix Abduction, arising from the Talmud, can also be applied to the analysis of paradoxes in voting and judgement aggregation. In fact we have here a general method for executing non-deductive inferences.
26th May
Alexander Bird
The Epistemology of Science: an Overview
Abstract: In this talk I outline my conception of the epistemology of science. In particular I discuss the aim of science, scientfic progress, the nature of scientific evidence, the failings of empiricism, inference to the best (or only) explanation, and Kuhnian psychology of discovery.
Hilary term seminars
27th January
Hannes Leitgeb, University of Bristol.
The Prospects of Formal Philosophy.
Abstract:I will give various examples that are meant to highlight the importance of logical and mathematical methods in current philosophy, and I will argue that these methods will become even more prominent in future philosophy. In particular, I will deal with the following questions (which emerge from my own work and which are also related to the "information theme" of the seminar):
- Is it Possible to Reconstruct Properties from Similarity?
- Are There True but Absolutely Unprovable Statements?
- Do Connectionism and Symbolic Computationalism Exclude Each Other?
- Can We Justify Probability Theory from Closeness to the Truth?
- (If there is time:) Is There a Probabilistic Way Out of Semantic Paradoxes?
The slides from Hannes' talk can be found here.
10th February
Jon Williamson, University of Kent.
Do probability and causality exist?
Abstract: Bruno de Finetti famously said that probability does not exist. In this talk I will give an overview of my own research, which develops this thesis and extends it to causality. But I shall maintain - contra de Finetti - that while neither probability nor causality exist, they are both objective in the sense that there is a fact of the matter as to whether a probabilistic or causal claim is true. So the views that I advocate - an objective Bayesian account of probability and an analogous epistemic account of causality - steer a course between realism and subjectivism. Information ties these views together: an agent's probabilistic and causal beliefs should capture the information she has to hand, but they should not be any more informative than that. Probability and causality themselves can be construed as the probabilistic and causal beliefs of an agent who is maximally informed.
The slides from Jon's talk can be found here, and a video of his talk is here (Warning: large download!).
24th February
Richard Bradley, London School of Economics.
Conditionals and the Unification of Decision Theory.
Hypothetical reasoning is essential to decision making and implicit views on what instances of such reasoning may be considered rational are contained in central principles of Bayesian decision theory such as the Sure-thing Principle. Yet there is little explicit discussion of its nature in decision theory, nor of the logic of the conditional propositions or sentences that are employed by agents when reasoning hypothetically. In this talk, I will explore the implications for Bayesian decision of the adoption of particular theories of conditionals and show in particular that by doing so it is possible to unify the disparate theories presented by Ramsey, Savage, Jeffrey and others. If there is time I will also look at the connections between hypothetical reasoning and Jeffrey conditioning, as a way of raising questions about the way in which information should be represented and integrated into models of attitude change.
The slides from Richard's talk can be found here, and a video of his talk is here (Warning: large download!).
10th March
Michael Wooldridge, University of Liverpool.
"Professor Kripke, let me introduce Professor Nash: Logic for Economic Mechanism Design"
Recent years have seen an enormous growth of interest in work at the intersection of logic and game theory. For example, researchers have used logic to make explicit the assumptions such as common knowledge that underpin many solution concepts, and have shown how solution concepts can be given a precise logical characterisation. From the perspective of computer science, these links open up the possibility of applying automated verification techniques, such as model checking, to the analysis and verification of computational mechanisms. We describe our work in this area, focussing on the use of an auction-like Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism for the design of multi-agent coordination mechanisms.
The slides from Mike's talk can be found here